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INTRODUCTION AND THESIS
Counter-insurgency operations have been and will remain part of the United
States' foreign policy. In the past fifty years counter-insurgencies have been fought on every continent. As the world's sole "super power" with a National Military Strategy of "Shape,
Respond and Prepare Now", direct involvement in counter-insurgency operations is very likely.
Unfortunately, while there is ample proof that such operations will be part of the future, there is a lack of doctrine to guide successful preparation, planning and execution. To support the national strategy, doctrine is needed that will prepare the United States for success.
The United States lacks a complete and coherent military doctrine for conducting counter-insurgency operations. As a result, leaders, planners and individual servicemen are not training for the full spectrum of tasks necessary to be successful. This is the case jointly and among our service branches. This paper will showcase historical examples and scholarly studies to identify what essentials should be addressed, and provide lessons learned upon which future counter-insurgency doctrine can be formed. Specific proposals will be made to reshape doctrine and the pitfalls of failing to correct deficiencies will be explained.
PRESENT U.S. DOCTRINE
Doctrine necessarily begins with precise language. The Joint Doctrinal definitions are essential to any discussion on this topic because there is confusion and overlap among historical scholars and the military. The most common mistake is the interchangeable use of the terms insurgent and guerrilla.
The aspects of social, political and judicial struggle are closer to the foundation of an insurgency whereas the guerrilla is a means to an end. Insurgency warfare involves more than fighting; guerrilla or conventional fighting. A guerrilla is an unconventional warfare combatant who is also an insurgent, but not all insurgents are guerrillas. Understanding these differences is important because we cannot be satisfied with the attention given to counter-guerrilla or unconventional warfare alone. Counter-guerrilla warfare is a type of unconventional warfare and both can be aspects of counter-insurgency operations. It can be seen in history that conducting a successful counter-insurgency requires a full range of operations. In fact, excessive concentration on counter-guerrilla operations, or the disconnection between military operations in general and other aspects of counter-insurgency warfare are formulas for failure.
This first doctrinal gap between definitions highlights a serious gap between our tactics and strategy. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used in counter-guerrilla operations are well addressed in our service manuals. Offense, defense, fire support and combat service support tactics all have some application in counter-insurgency operations. and judicial aspects so essential in counter-insurgency operations.
Our review of doctrine reveals a need for corrective action. Clearly, we have a capable military that can be molded to achieve success in whatever it is trained to do, but it must identify what those needs are. To do this, history shows some of the essentials to successful counterinsurgency operations. Two historically significant counter-insurgency operations provide the lessons learned and stimulate recommendations for how to improve doctrine.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
The value in analysis of past counter-insurgency operations is in the lessons learned about the nature of such operations in general, and their critical strengths and vulnerabilities in particular. While no two insurgencies are identical, neither are two counter-insurgencies identical. However, similarities exist to guide doctrine, strategy, operations and tactics. The
British counter-insurgency effort in Malaya, and then the French effort in Algeria will help provide a focus on the tenets of insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare. While the former is touted as a successful operation and the later is not, each shows instances of both positive and negative actions that can collectively be addressed as tenants of future counter-insurgency doctrine.
MALAYA (1947-1960)
The insurgency Because the insurgents began their post-war insurgency with a core of party loyalists, they transitioned to guerrilla operations quickly. Terrorist acts, attacks on weak and scattered police outposts, intimidation, extortion, and propaganda came quickly and frequently. First to respond were the police and judicial branches of British government. An emergency was proclaimed, some civil rights were restricted and guerrillas were actively pursued. While police forces were expanded and the limited military initially available was used both to pursue guerrillas and protect civilians, insurgent activities also grew.
Success for Britain was very much in question until a very significant decision was made;
the Briggs plan was put into effect. (So named because of the British General Sir Harold Briggs who was the Director of Operations.) The plan called for dominating the populated areas, destroying the communist organizations, isolating and then eliminating the "bandits". Before this could be done however, the British needed to greatly increase their military, police and Home Guard force. Eventually, against 6,000 to 8,000 insurgents the British mustered 40,000 police, 40,000 British soldiers and 250,000 members of the Home Guard. This force ratio of 55:1 was key to success. Having such an overwhelming force meant the British could be strong in many places at once. They could protect the people from the insurgents, isolate them from outside support and hunt them in their own backyard.
The British military employed were conventional light infantry. Although their counterguerrilla skills were sharpened during the counter-insurgency, they remained a conventional "...demonstrated that it is a decisive factor not only in defeating the insurgents, but also in establishing a political solution. The machinery did, however, have to be built up after the emergency had been declared, and twelve years' struggle might have been shorter, or indeed never have got going at all if the cooperation that was finally attained had existed in 1948."
British success in Malaya was plagued by some serious initial weaknesses. The greatest error was in not investing enough manpower early in the emergency. Secondly, although ultimately a key to their success, the British were slow in recognizing the Malayan people and their desire for independence as the strategic center of gravity and take action to protect them and improve their condition. Finally, they recognized the "cause" espoused by the insurgents had merit and in 1952 promised independence; granted in 1957.
ALGERIA (1954-1962)
The areas and isolating the insurgents by exclusion also proved effective but it did not contribute to solving the "cause" of the insurgency and did not thoroughly address the center of gravity.
The French did many things well militarily. They killed many ALN and have even been credited with "winning" militarily. They built-up their forces quickly and to a good level. Their concept of la guerre revolutionnaries was sound and their quadrillage system was promising.
But they ultimately lost because they could not connect the operational and strategic goals to their tactical means.
TENETS OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
Insurgencies have been fought for a variety of reasons. Ideologically they may be motivated by a variety of factors; communism, nationalism, ethnicity, crime and religion. But the root cause of an insurgency is never just ideological. There is always an issue or issues that give the insurgents a cause around which to build support. Identification of this cause is essential if the counter-insurgency is to be successful. Addressing the cause as the strategic center of gravity should focus the whole effort of the counter-insurgency. While the same center of gravity may not exist at each level of war, the link between the different levels to ultimately impact the strategic center of gravity is critical. So too is it critical that the different means of counter-insurgency work in harmony with strategic goals. Historically, the British were far more effective at this than the French.
Like any other crisis, an insurgency has a beginning, middle and end. The strategies vary in each part and can even be repeated, but commonly at its beginning, an insurgency is weak. This initial position of weakness is an opportunity host nations typically do not capitalize on. Especially in democratic societies, the slowness to react allows insurgencies to grow and may even provide instances for the insurgents to propagandize. The start of an insurgency involves building a "party" or organization, establishing leadership and beginning the education of potential followers. As the organization grows, its acts of insurgency go beyond words and involve terrorist and guerrilla actions. Initially these tactics are used because the organization is new, resource constrained and trying to grow. As it progresses the insurgency will not cease these types of operations, only their frequency, intensity and movement of forces will change.
The insurgent's final stage will be a shift to conventional warfare. In this stage, after growing in support and resources, the insurgency hopes to have weakened the host nation enough to defeat him in combat. While these stages are normally successive, in some cases a stage can be skipped or even repeated if the counter-insurgency has some success. These stages are organized into five specific functions as follows: Early application of military force is a critical aspect of successful counter-insurgency operations; so too is the combined application of means available to the host nation. Essential military force used by the counter-insurgent is a means towards defeating the insurgent's guerrillas and/or conventional forces. While defeat of these forces may be recognized as the tactical center of gravity it is but one part of the overall operation. To be successful, the cause of the insurgency must be addressed, problems must be solved and the host nation's people must be protected. Whether it comes from within or outside the host nation, the following means must be used in combating an insurgency: The insurgent has two great strengths that require attention by the host nation: the ability to seize and maintain the initiative, and the uses of time and space to compensate for a shortcoming in forces. By their nature, insurgencies are protracted and asymmetric in force application. The insurgent picks and chooses when, where and how he will strike. By doing so he has the initiative and can force the counter-insurgent to strike back wantonly, with little effect.
The insurgent will remain dispersed to keep from becoming a lucrative target for the counterinsurgent's forces. He will then mass his forces to strike the counter-insurgent who has been forced to disperse, and therefore weaken his military, in order to cover more territory. Unless the initiative is taken away from him and the operational factors are made to benefit the counterinsurgent, the insurgent will likely succeed.
While the insurgent tries to capitalize on his own strengths, so too must the counterinsurgent. Although tainted by whatever the cause of the insurgency may be (it will have some appeal to some sector of society) the host nation does have the legitimacy and rights of a sovereign nation. Its judiciary, police and social infra-structure are already established. Having such a structure is exactly what the insurgent is trying to build while establishing his party and expanding his influence. This infra-structure is a strength because it can facilitate taking legal action against the insurgency; its party, supporters and military faction. This same infra-structure should be used to address the causes of the insurgency, i.e., land reform, social equality, etc.
Finally, being a legitimate nation means having rapid access to international agencies like the United Nations and the World Bank who can help "fix" the problem, combat the insurgents or both.
Militarily, the counter-insurgent must be careful not to win the battle and lose the war.
While the role of the military, both SOF and conventional, is critical, it cannot "win" the counterinsurgency. To do that all the means of power must be employed. The military can lose the counter-insurgency if it is not employed in a manner consistent with the attainment of the strategic objective. The previously examined historical examples were both successful military actions at the tactical level. The French however, poisoned the people with their brutal treatment and to that extent they fed the insurgent's propaganda machine and turned neutral and proFrench populations towards the National Liberation Front (FLN) .
Examination of the British success in Malaya and the French failure in Algeria facilitates drawing several conclusions and lessons learned which can then be applied to the critical evaluation of doctrine. Ultimately, proposals to change counter-insurgency doctrine will be made.
CONCLUSIONS FROM HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
From the analysis of history, four principles not emphasized in doctrine, yet clearly essential to successful prosecution of a counter-insurgency are offered: 1. Deploy
Conventional Light Infantry Forces Early. Counter-insurgency is not the sole realm of SOF and although they are an essential ingredient in pursuing this type of warfare, if the insurgency is able to operate in stage III, SOF alone will not be enough. While JP 3-07.1 is right to warn about "Americanization" of another country's war, hesitation in the requisite application of force yields the initiative to the insurgent. 2. The Application of Conventional Force Must Be Robust.
History shows that although conventional forces are key, they must overwhelm to achieve results. Counter-insurgency operations can be strengthened by precision firepower, timely command and control (C2), intelligence-surrveillance-reconnaisance (ISR), and modern The most natural mission for conventional military forces is destruction of the insurgent's guerrillas. As we have seen, much more is likely to be required. This will blur distinction between the tactical missions assigned and the operational or strategic objectives to be attained.
Applied at the operational level, these four principles will help bridge the doctrinal gap we have today. The British and French experiences demonstrate that some adjustment in tactics and techniques will be required whenever forces are deployed. Deploying conventional force early is as important as those forces arriving ready to take decisive action. Democracies react slowly but sound doctrine can help ensure capable forces are employed. Regardless of how fast forces are deployed, if they are not prepared it could make the situation worse than not having them there at all.
ALIGNMENT OF DOCTRINE TO HISTORICAL LESSONS LEARNED
The gap between strategy and tactics is dangerously wide. At the operational level of war, counter-insurgency operations are not an assigned mission, only unconventional warfare is "assigned". The focus on "pure" military aspects of counter-insurgency operations at the tactical level could lead to a disconnect between all the assets applied to win the counter-insurgency war. If only as a matter of emphasis operational commanders must expect to apply force across the spectrum of conflict and understand how tactical actions will have operational and strategic implications.
PROPOSALS TO ALTER DOCTRINE
A properly focused doctrine reflects an understanding of the lessons from history and outlines a formula for future success. In the case of counter-insurgency operations, as demonstrated in the previous section, the U.S. has a significant doctrine-future operations disconnect. To avoid pending failure corrections are needed in doctrine, training and exercise routine.
The UJTL categorizes FID at the theater strategic level to "coordinate theater foreign internal defense activities." What is needed is a tasking for someone to conduct these operations. At the operational level, under the task of Operational Maneuver and Movement should be, "conduct foreign internal defense". Adding this task provides focus to the operational commander and his staff while providing a means of identifying who will conduct the many and diverse aspects of FID. Presently, the task of "conduct unconventional warfare" without mentioning FID as a whole drives the force assignment exclusively to SOF. The focus on SOF for FID in general and counter-insurgency operations in particular can leave our conventional light forces unprepared and misused.
Joint Publication 3-07.1 (FID) needs a change in emphasis. Presently there is great stress placed on supporting FID through non-combat means. It states that if combat forces are required, they will be used for protection and stabilizing the situation. The JP should emphasize the use of conventional force as likely, and above stage II in the insurgency, key to successful operations. The JP does not have to be a proponent of the use of U.S. forces. It should emphasize foremost that conventional forces in overwhelming number are necessary. It should also identify counter-insurgency operations as a conventional forces' mission that operational commanders must be prepared to fully integrate into a FID strategy.
It is not enough to have a joint publication on FID that mentions counter-insurgency operations. There should be a joint publication specifically addressing counter-insurgencies.
Actions and responsibilities at the theater strategic, operational and tactical levels need to be addressed from the military, police and judicial, humanitarian, political and economic perspectives. This publication needs to capture the essence of insurgent warfare and how to fight and win against it. Such a publication will provide the impetus for service doctrine development.
America enjoys the freedom to decide; take action, or not take action. If we choose not to change our outlook on counter-insurgency warfare and fix our doctrine we will pay a price. Our present doctrine has us heading for trouble in several areas. The pitfalls of not fixing the disconnect between Doctrine and the conduct of counter-insurgency operations have already been mentioned and are provided in Annex II as a recap.
CONCLUSION
U.S. joint and service doctrine does not sufficiently addresses counter-insurgency operations. Counter-insurgency warfare has been and will remain a sign of the times. To be successful in the future, the United States must prepare now with doctrine that guides the operational commander and staff to success. Conventional light forces must be ready for large scale employment and complete integration of counter-insurgency tasks. Failure to recognize the likely future and adjust doctrine to ready forces, could cause the late application of the wrong force executing a different mission that is not synchronized with all the means of national power being applied.
